Section 1, Chapter 3 of the Logic of God
The subjective world represents the domain of reality that is the greatest failure of Naturalistic philosophy. By subjective world, I am referring to the world of perceptions and thoughts that live inside the minds of persons.
Inability of naturalistic epistemology to define the ontological status of perception
Perceptions have real existence. This can be proven rather easily. Having a perception in mind has different consequences for the life of the mind than the absence of that perception. If that perception were NULL, then there would be no difference between its presence and absence in the mind.
All perceptions have real existence as perceptions, but not all perceptions are valid as signifiers of reality that transcends the perception. For example, the statement “There are flying pink elephants.” may describe a perception that exists in the imagination. Still, it does not signify anything existing outside of the mind that imagined it.
The impossibility of naturalistic reality to create delusions that are a part of subjectivity
The subjective realm is the world of our conscious perceptions and concepts. Every person possesses this conscious world. It is undeniable that this world exists and that it has some type of ontological status. It is equally undeniable that the particular perceptions and conceptions also exist, having an ontological status of some value that is defined by the conscious, subjective realm. All perceptions have ontological status as perceptions. They do because their existence changes the state of the subjective domain as a set.
Not all perceptions have the same ontological status. Some perceptions signify an ontology or being that lies beyond the perception as a perception. When we perceive it to be ‘daytime’ during the day, that perception accurately signifies something true beyond the perception. If I perceive it to be ‘nighttime’ during the day, that perception fails to accurately signify any state of affairs beyond my perception. Perceptions that signify reality beyond my perception have a different ontological status than perceptions that do not.
One of the distinct features of the subjective realm is imagination. Imagination can be used to frame simple or complex perceptions, ideas, and stories that do not exist outside of the realm of the imagination. Some imaginations are framed as imaginations, with the person understanding it to be imaginary. There are, however, some imaginations that are framed in a mind as having actual existence outside the imagination when they have no such existence outside of the imagination. These are delusions.
Delusions have real existence in the imagination as imaginations; the ontological state of the imagination that has a given delusion is different than that same imagination without the given delusion. To deny this would imply that the imagination does not exist. It is undeniable that imagination exists, or we would not have imagination. If imagination itself has ontological status, then the particular products of that imagination have an ontological status relative to that imagination; the ontology of the imagination confers an ontological status upon the objects it creates. Denial of this renders the concept of imagination meaningless.
The fact that ultimate reality must be absolute truth creates difficulties for the Materialist narrative. When one considers that, according to the law of non-contradiction, nothing can be true and false in the same context, that truth is absolute. The very denial of absolute truth is a claim to absolute truth: it is either absolutely true or true only in certain contexts. If the denial of absolute truth is true only in certain contexts, then in the other contexts, absolute truth is real, and therefore absolute truth exists.
Absolute truth is the reference frame for relative or contingent truths. Particular truths are defined in relation to or in compatibility with absolute truth, with falsehood designating the absence of a relation or denial of compatibility. Particular truths, then, must be compatible with absolute truth.Absolute truth is, then, the ultimate reality.
How is it possible, then, for a material ultimate reality as absolute to produce delusions or any structure that creates delusions? Since truth can’t contradict itself, it is simply not possible for an impersonal, material absolute truth to create delusions or delusion-creating structures. A material, absolute truth could only create material absolute truths; there is no possibility of contingent reality or delusions in a materialistic universe. While materialists may posit that consciousness, subjectivity and imagination are products of material processes, material reality lacks the categories to create a virtual, imaginary, subjective layer with classes and objects existing at an inferior ontological status – as less than absolute truth or as constructs containing falsehood3:1. Only in a Theistic worldview is it possible for the creation of the contingent and corruptible objects that are commonly part of our experience.
Inability of naturalistic reality to define moral categories
Naturalistic reality is an insufficient ground for defining morality. Naturalistic reality can be interpreted in materialistic terms or pantheistic terms. Both fail to explain morality.
The materialistic or naturalistic worldview necessarily defines objective truth in terms of material reality. Thus, the only way for morality to be objective in a materialistic view is to be defined in terms of material properties. Objective morality exists because it is material. This, however, proves to be a very, very flimsy base for morals. If materialism is true, then Marquis de Sade is correct when he says that “Whatever is, is right.” If morality is a material phenomenon, then violations of the moral law are just as real as the moral law. Murders are just as real as the law against murder. Materialism provides no reference frame for ontologically distinguishing good from evil.
Pantheism suffers the same problem as materialism in defining morals. If all of reality is the divine godhead, then there is no baseline to ontologically distinguish good events from evil events, as both types of events are equally divine.
As neither Pantheism nor Materialism has an adequate reference frame for ontologically distinguishing good from evil, all moral judgments made in religious and philosophical systems based on these worldviews are completely arbitrary. These worldviews have no basis to objectively assert any moral claims that are obligatory. Furthermore, in these views, there are no properties inherent in the subjective world of another individual or of society that obligate one morally, and while empathy in early man and utilitarianism in modern man may motivate people to invent ethical systems, these factors are limited to sociological and anthropological significance and carry no moral authority.
Only a transcendent, supernaturalistic world-view can provide an adequate basis for ontologically distinguishing good from evil. The nature of supernatural reality in absolute truth provides the baseline that transcends the natural world. Events in the natural world can be evaluated on the basis of whether they are morally consistent with this transcendent, supernatural reality. Inchapter 14, it will be shown that the character of the Infinite-Personal God is the reference frame for morality. In the next chapter, it will be shown not only how God defines good and evil but also how God responds to evil.
Chapter 3 References
1. For more information on how contingent and corruptible objects be created, go to chapter 10.God spoke creation into existence. For more information about how humanity corrupted this creation, go to chapter 17,The Fall of Man and the Corruption of Creation.